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III. Securitization of Fringe Economy
Receivables – A Lender’s Issue

SECURITIZATION OF ABERRANT CONTRACT RECEIVABLES
THOMAS E. PLANK *
I. INTRODUCTION
Companies that are in the business of originating or acquiring rights to
payment for moneys lent, property sold, or services provided—
receivables—need funds to operate their businesses. These receivables can
arise in two different situations. First, the receivables arise from loans of
funds by the originator to the obligors, such as residential mortgage loans,
commercial business loans, student loans, and other kinds of personal or
business loans, which could include payday loans, title loans, and other
“aberrant contract receivables.” In these cases, the originator needs funds to
lend. Other receivables arise from the selling or leasing of goods or other
property or from providing services on credit, such as automobile loans and
leases, trade receivables, equipment loans and leases, and health care receivables. For these cases, the provider of the property or servicers needs
funds (1) to repay funds borrowed to acquire the property sold or leased or
to provide the services or (2) to acquire more property or to provide future
services.
Originators can obtain funds from equity investors and typically must
do so to begin business. 1 At some point, however, the higher cost of equity
investment will cause originators to turn to other sources of financing. One
traditional source of financing is a simple whole loan sale of batches of the
receivables to another financial institution. 2
*Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B. 1968,
Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland. I have benefitted both professionally and
financially serving as issuer’s counsel and bankruptcy counsel for securitization of mortgage loans and
other consumer and business receivables, first as a partner with Kutak Rock LLP from 1987 to 1994,
and then as a consultant for law firms on securitizations. The views expressed in this article are my
personal views informed by my practice experience as well as my research and analysis of the issues
and are not the views of any law firm for which I serve or have served as a consultant.
1. See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 5-11, 237-38, 248-50, 282-84, 306-10, 338-41 (2004) (describing the difference between
equity and debt, the different types of debt, and the factors that a company will consider in deciding to
issue equity or debt).
2. See, e.g., NetBank, FSB v. Kipperman (In re Commercial Money Center, Inc.), 350 B.R. 465
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a purported sale by Commercial Money Center, Inc.—which leased
equipment to lessees with sub-prime credit, packaged groups of leases together, and assigned its contractual rights to future lease payments to financial entities, including NetBank, FSB—of a pool of
future lease payments to NetBank pursuant to a sale and servicing agreement constituted a grant of a
171

172

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

Dealers that sell property in exchange for receivables will typically
sell their receivables to financial companies that dictate the terms of the
receivables. These financial companies are also referred to as originators,
and this process is known as the indirect origination of receivables. 3 Another traditional source of financing is borrowing from another financial
institution, typically by granting to the lender a security interest to secure
the loan. 4 A more recent source of financing receivables is securitization
and structured finance.
For mortgage loan receivables, securitization primarily 5 involves the
sale of the mortgage loans to a trustee to be held in trust and the issuance of
pass-through certificates that are then sold into the capital markets, often
with a rating. The pass-through certificates evidence the beneficial interests
in, but not the legal title to, the underlying mortgage loans, and the certificate holders are entitled to all of the cash flow from the mortgage loans.
For non-mortgage loan receivables, securitization and structured finance
primarily combine the two traditional forms of receivables financing: (1)
traditional accounts receivables financing in which the lender takes a security interest in receivables and the borrower retains liability for default, and
(2) factoring, in which the purchaser of receivables assumes the risk of loss
from default by the obligors. 6 In a securitization or structured finance
transaction, the owner of the receivables sells them to a separate legal person, typically a wholly owned subsidiary, that is intended to be a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity (an “SPE”). In a securitization, the SPE
issues debt securities, often rated by a rating agency, and in a structured

security interest and not a true sale of the lease payments); Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of Cal.,
Inc.), 829 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding sale of residential mortgage loans and interests in such
loans to investors by Golden Plan of California, a mortgage loan broker).
3. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, ABS: GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND
ASSUMPTIONS FOR RATING U.S. AUTO LOAN SECURITIZATIONS, ¶ 13 (Jan. 11, 2011, republished Jan. 5,
2012) [hereinafter, S&P AUTO LOAN CRITERIA] (“Most auto financings are indirect auto loans, which
means that the auto dealer helped to secure financing for the buyer. Direct auto loans are those in which
the consumer obtained the loan directly from a financial institution.”).
4. See, e.g., Funding Sys. Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Chem. Bus. Credit Corp. (In re Funding Sys.
Asset Mgmt. Corp.), 111 B.R. 500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (addressing the extent to which a secured
creditor had perfected its security interest in chattel paper in the form of equipment leases originated by
a lease financing company).
5. Non-mortgage receivables, such as automobile loans, have been securitized by the issuance of
pass-through certificates, and mortgage loan securitizations and structured finance transactions have
used special purpose entity (“SPE”) borrowers. Nevertheless, because of the differences between the
two kinds of receivables, the vast majority of mortgage and non-mortgage loan securitizations have
followed the pattern described in the text.
6. See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper
Under the U.C.C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV.
397, 406–12 (1994) (describing the history of financing for accounts receivable before the enactment of
Article 9 of the U.C.C.).
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finance transaction, the SPE borrows from a lender. In both cases, the SPE
borrower grants a security interest in the receivables to secure the debt
securities or the loan, which is primarily payable from the receivables.
Accordingly, from a structuring perspective, there is no significant difference between a securitization and a structured finance transaction.
Originators of receivables use securitization and structured finance
debt transactions when they produce lower financing costs and greater benefits than sales or traditional lending. Although securitization and structured finance debt transactions are more complicated and entail greater
structuring and operational costs, in many cases they result in lower overall
financing costs and provide the originators with a greater return than whole
loan sales or traditional lending. 7 These cost savings arise primarily from
the reduced risks to the lenders and investors, which I will also call lenders,
that hold debt obligations of the SPE borrower. The reduced risks result
from the separation of the risk associated with the receivables, which the
lenders in a debt securitization/structured finance transaction bear and
which they can more easily assess, from all of the other risks facing an
originator that is an operating company, which are more difficult and more
costly to assess.
In the case of a sale of receivables, the originator transfers to the buyer
all of the benefits and burdens of ownership. If the receivables produce any
surplus over the purchase price, the buyer, not the seller, realizes the benefit of the surplus. In the case of a traditional secured loan, the originator as
borrower retains the full benefits of ownership of the receivables, but the
borrower must compensate the lender for two different risks that the lender
faces. First, the lender as well as the owner takes the risk that the receivables themselves will not perform as well as expected and as well as necessary to repay the loan. This risk includes not only the risk of non-payment
by the obligors, but also the risk of loss if the market value of the receivables declines to less than the amount owed on the loan.
Second, even if the receivables themselves perform well enough to repay the loan, there is a risk that the owner/borrower encounters financial
difficulties for reasons not related to the receivables. These reasons could
include poor performance on another batch of receivables securing a different loan; poor performance of other business operations, such as servicing,
that give rise to creditors who are not paid; and the risk of tort liability for
7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture: Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions; Does Dodd-frank Help, or Hurt?, 72 LA. L. REV. 591, 591-92, n.1
(2012) [hereinafter, Schwarcz, Securitization and Dodd-Frank]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Roberta
Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility in Securitization Transactions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 803,
806-07 (2012); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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any kind of tort that the operating company could commit. If the owner/borrower gets into financial difficulties or creditors take actions to collect debts owed to them, an owner/borrower has an incentive to file a
voluntary petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. 8 In addition, the
borrower could become subject to an involuntary petition filed by unsecured creditors. 9
As discussed in Part II below, the commencement of a bankruptcy
case by or against the owner/borrower subjects the secured lender to additional costs—what have been referred to as a “bankruptcy tax” 10—and to
cover those costs, the lenders must charge a higher interest rate—an increase which I have elsewhere called a “bankruptcy premium.” 11 Securitizations and structured finance transactions avoid the bankruptcy tax that
would otherwise be imposed on the secured lending transaction and the
bankruptcy premium that lenders would have to charge to cover the bankruptcy tax arising out of the risk of bankruptcy for reasons not related to the
receivables.
Securitizations and structured finance transactions do not avoid the
bankruptcy tax altogether. To the extent that the receivables themselves do
not perform, and the lender seeks to foreclose its security interest in the
receivables held by the SPE borrower, the SPE borrower will have a reason
to commence a bankruptcy case. Nevertheless, for traditional receivables, it
is generally much easier to assess the credit quality of a pool of receivables
and the risk of bankruptcy because of poor performance of the receivables
than to assess the credit quality of an operating company. 12 Securitizations
and structured finance transactions are cost-effective when the risk associ8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (providing for the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case).
10. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1055, 1064 (1998).
11. See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1655, 1660-71 (2004) [hereinafter Plank, Security of Securitization].
12. See, e.g., S&P AUTO LOAN CRITERIA, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6,15:
Standard & Poor’s methodology for rating and monitoring auto lease ABS securitizations
consists of a review of collateral characteristics, static pool and portfolio performance, thirdparty forecasts of residual values, historical auction data, current used vehicle market values,
and transaction structures. Based on this review, cash flow modeling parameters are established for the purpose of modeling the transaction’s payment structure and analyzing the
pool’s ability to pay timely interest and ultimate principal under stress scenarios that are consistent with the assigned ratings. These criteria address the risks associated with the:
Credit quality of securitized assets;
Cash flow mechanics and payment structure;
Operational and administrative risk;
Counterparty risk; and
Legal and regulatory risk.
See also app. tbls.2-4 (presenting historical data on auto loan performance since 1925).
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ated with the receivables is less than all of the other risks of an operating
company.
The isolation of risk that produces the cost savings by a securitization
and structured finance transaction requires structural features absent from
the traditional secured loan. As described in Part III below, the structural
features necessary to achieve this isolation of risks consists of two elements. First, the originator, which is generally an operating company, must
transfer the receivables to an SPE borrower in a way that removes the receivables from the potential bankruptcy estate of the originator seller—
what is commonly referred to as a “true sale.” Second, the SPE borrower
itself and the loan transaction to the SPE borrower must be structured to
minimize the risk that the SPE borrower will become a debtor in bankruptcy for reasons not related to the receivables. Both the debt incurred by the
SPE to acquire the receivables and the SPE borrower itself must be “bankruptcy remote.” The heart of these structural requirements is that the lender
must look primarily to the receivables for repayment, and not to the originator or sponsor of the securitization or structured finance transaction.
Although securitization and structured finance have been used for a
wide variety of receivables, it does not follow that a securitization or structured finance transaction is cost-effective or feasible for every type of receivable. The characteristics of each type of receivable and the different
characteristics of the business model for financing receivables will dictate
the cost-effectiveness or feasibility of a securitization or structure financed
transaction for any particular receivable. As I discuss in Part IV below, the
nature of aberrant contract receivables may present challenges to using
securitization or structured finance as a form of financing. Determining the
feasibility of securitization or structured finance for aberrant contract receivables requires detailed knowledge of these receivable. This article
seeks only to identify the relevant issues for such a determination.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY TAX ON SECURED CREDIT
As the most recent codification of a body of law that first appeared in
the sixteenth century, the Bankruptcy Code addresses the problem that
exists in any credit economy of the borrower that has insufficient liquid
assets to repay his, her, or its creditors. 13 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a
borrower can become a debtor in bankruptcy by filing a voluntary petition,
which constitutes an “order for relief,” to liquidate its assets under Chapter
13. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV.
487 (1996) (describing the development of bankruptcy law in England and the United States).
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7, or to reorganize its affairs under Chapter 11. 14 In a Chapter 7 liquidation,
an independent trustee is appointed to liquidate the assets, 15 and in a Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor becomes the “debtor in possession,” which
continues to operate the business of the debtor and which has the powers of
a bankruptcy trustee. 16 Creditors can also initiate a bankruptcy case against
the debtor by filing an involuntary petition, and the court will enter an order of relief unless the petition is controverted, in which case the court will
enter an order for relief only if the debtor is not paying its debts as they
become due. 17
The commencement of a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy case has
the effect of accelerating all claims that creditors have against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case.18 In addition, the filing of
a petition automatically stays actions by creditors to collect their debts,
including the commencement or continuation of litigation and enforcement
of liens against property of the estate. 19 Also, all unsecured and under-

14. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2012) (providing that “debtor” means a “person or municipality
concerning which a case under this title has been commenced”); § 109 (providing what types of an
entity may be a debtor under the different chapters of the Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012)
(providing that a “voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter”);
§ 301(b) (providing that the “commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title constitutes
an order for relief under such chapter”).
15. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (2012) (providing for the appointment of an interim bankruptcy
trustee and the election of the bankruptcy trustee); § 704 (providing for the duties of the trustee, including the liquidation of property of the estate); § 725 (requiring the trustee to dispose of property in which
a third party has an interest, such as a lien); § 726 (providing for distribution of property of the estate,
including distributions to creditors).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (providing that “debtor in possession” means the debtor unless
an independent trustee is appointed); § 1107 (providing that the debtor in possession has substantially
all of the powers of the trustee under Chapter 11); § 1108 (authorizing the trustee, which normally is the
debtor in possession, to operate the debtor’s business).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (providing that an “involuntary case may be commenced only
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, that may be a debtor under the
chapter under which such case is commenced”); § 303(b)-(c) (setting forth the requirements for an
involuntary petition); § 303(h) (providing for the entry of the order for relief).
18. A creditor is an entity that has a claim that arose before the order of relief. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(10) (2012). Proof of creditors’ claims may be filed by creditors or the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 501
(2012). Claims are allowed unless a party in interest objects. § 502(a). If an objection is made, section
502(b) provides that the bankruptcy court “after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of
such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall
allow such claim in such amount” with certain exceptions not relevant to this discussion. § 502(b). The
court must estimate certain contingent and unliquidated claims. § 502(c).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). This subsection provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a
judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
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secured creditors do not accrue interest on their claims after the commencement of the case.20 These provisions impose costs on unsecured
creditors. They are nevertheless necessary for the efficient liquidation of
the debtor’s assets for distribution to the debtor’s unsecured creditors or
reorganization of the debtor’s affairs for the benefit of the unsecured creditors.
These provisions also apply to creditors that have a security interest in
assets owned by the debtor. 21 In addition to the costs imposed by acceleration and the automatic stay, secured creditors are subject to other risks.
These include: (1) the risk that a bankruptcy court would allow the bankruptcy trustee to substitute other collateral for the collateral that the secured
creditor bargained for, so long as the court determines that the creditor is
“adequately protected,” 22 and (2) the risk that the bankruptcy court would
subordinate the secured creditor’s claim to the security interest of a debtorin-possession lender, again so long as the court determines that the creditor
is “adequately protected.” 23
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to
exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title against any claim against the debtor.
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (providing for a determination by the court of the amount of the
claim allowed “except to the extent that . . . such claim is for unmatured interest”); United Sav. Ass’n of
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 370-371 (1988) (holding that an undersecured
creditor is not entitled to receive interest to compensate the creditor for the delay of foreclosure caused
by the bankruptcy case). Note that oversecured creditors are allowed to accrue interest. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(b).
21. In my view, the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of secured creditors is less than ideal not only
for the financing of receivables. See Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L. REV. 253, 263-68, 336-49 (2000) (discussing the bankruptcy law history of the expanded jurisdiction over secured creditors and the policy reasons for
limiting a creditor in possession of collateral obligation to return collateral).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012) (providing that adequate protection of an entity’s interest may be
provided by “an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant
results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such property”); § 363(b)-(c), (f) (providing
that the bankruptcy trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the estate or sell property in which the
estate has an interest under certain conditions); § 363(e) (providing that, “on request of an entity that
has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee,
the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to
provide adequate protection of such interest”).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (providing that the bankruptcy court may: “authorize the obtaining
of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if (A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and (B) there is adequate
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Nevertheless, for certain types of assets and certain types of creditors,
the immediate acceleration of claims and the automatic stay may be desirable. In the case of a debtor that operates tangible assets, like real estate and
equipment, and finances those operations with loans secured by such assets, the acceleration of the secured claims and the imposition of the automatic stay may, in my view, be more efficient than allowing the secured
creditors to enforce their security interests, which bankruptcy law had allowed until the 1930s. In the case of a liquidation, if the debtor has equity
in the collateral, the bankruptcy trustee has a greater incentive and greater
ability to maximize the value of the collateral than a secured creditor,
which after all cannot realize any increase in that value above its secured
claim. In the case of a feasible reorganization of, say, a trucking company
or an airline, the reorganization cannot proceed if the secured creditors can
foreclose on the trucks or airplanes that secure their debt. Hence, the increased costs imposed on these secured lenders by such acceleration and
the automatic stay may be justified by a greater return for the secured creditors and unsecured creditors of the debtor.
The very existence of securitization, however, demonstrates that the
increased costs from the acceleration of secured claims, the imposition of
the automatic stay, and the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code discussed above, impose costs for secured lenders to originators of receivables
without significant benefit to the debtor or its other creditors. 24 For example, the costs imposed by the immediate acceleration of secured claims
explains why it is not feasible for an operating finance company that would
be subject to the Bankruptcy Code to finance the origination of long term
mortgage loans by issuing debt secured by mortgage loans. 25 It is no accident that, since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code effective in 1979,
more than eighty-nine percent of all mortgage loans have been held by
entities (1) that are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code or (2) that are bankruptcy remote issuers of asset-backed securities. 26

protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or
equal lien is proposed to be granted.”).
24. See Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal Structure and a
Fanciful Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 629-32 (2008) (explaining why the Bankruptcy Code
limitations on secured creditors with a security interest in receivables owned by an originator produce
essentially no benefit to the other creditors of the originator).
25. See Thomas E. Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market: The Nature of the Mortgage
Loan and Regulatory Reform, 12 TENN. J. BUS. LAW 135, 137-45 (2011) (describing the development
of mortgage finance, including public and private securitization, from 1945 to 2009, and explaining
why the nature of mortgage loans requires protection from acceleration of debt secured by long-term
mortgage loans).
26. See id. at 144-45, n.42.
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For shorter-term receivables, the costs of acceleration are not as significant, but the automatic stay and the other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code affecting secured creditors remain significant. A study done in 1988
provides one example of the cost savings from the securitization of automobile loans. 27 This study compared the costs and benefits of $4 billion in
asset-backed securities (“ABS”) backed by automobile loans originated by
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”) with the costs and
benefits of GMAC’s publicly issued corporate debt. The costs, all expressed as an annual percentage of outstanding balance, are set forth below: 28
Corp debt
AA+
Principal amount
$18 billion
Interest rate
7.01%
Fees
0.20%
Loss reserve/credit enhancement 0.50%
Net cost of capital
1.28%
Total
8.99%
Net difference
1.30%
GMAC transaction and rating

ABS AAA
$4 billion
6.91%
0.26%
0.52%
0.00%
7.69%

Although the slightly higher rating of the ABS—a AAA rating—
produced a cost savings of 0.10 percentage points, or 10 basis points, over
the corporate debt, which carried a AA+ rating, almost all of those savings
were eaten up by the higher transaction costs—6 basis points—and loss
reserves or credit enhancement—2 basis points. 29 The substantial cost savings derive from the costs of net capital—128 basis points—that GMAC
had to maintain to achieve a AA+ rating on its corporate debt. 30 Further, by
comparing rated corporate securities and rated asset-backed securities, this
study eliminates any cost savings attributable to the greater liquidity and
investor demand of securities over ordinary secured loans.
Although securitization and structured finance transactions avoid the
costs that the Bankruptcy Code imposes on secured creditors to operating
companies, structuring the transactions to avoid such costs also entails
additional costs. Part III describes the additional transactional requirements
27. See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized
Credit, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 36 (Fall 1988).
28. Id. at 36-40.
29. Id. at 40-41.
30. Id.
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to achieve bankruptcy remoteness. The question then remains whether aberrant contract receivables can satisfy the legal and credit-dependent requirements for structured finance and securitization transactions.
III. SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE REQUIREMENTS
As discussed above, securitization and structured finance debt transactions achieve bankruptcy remoteness by effecting a legal true sale of the
receivables to a separate, bankruptcy remote legal entity, the SPE that issues debt secured by the receivables. To ensure a structure that will likely
be respected by a bankruptcy court, the transaction documents will impose
significant limitations on the seller of the receivables, the SPE, and the
lender. Specifically, unlike a typical corporate financing in which a parent
of a borrower will also guarantee the debt of the subsidiary borrower, the
lenders must look primarily to the receivables for repayment and not to the
credit of the originator of the receivables. This limitation requires two different conditions: (1) reliable and predictable cash flow from the receivables, and (2) legal restrictions on the originator, the SPE, and the lenders.
A. The Nature of the Receivables
The value of any receivable depends on the willingness and ability of
the obligor to pay the amounts that the obligor agrees to pay. Accordingly,
determining the value of any receivable requires an examination of both the
obligor’s financial condition and the specific characteristics of the receivables that affect the likelihood of timely payment of the receivable. For
many different types of receivables, originators and lenders have developed
criteria for predicting the likelihood of timely payment of principal and
interest. Originators and lenders have also developed analyses to predict,
over a pool of receivables, the percentage of receivables that will default
and the amount that will likely be realized on defaulted receivables.31 The
larger the number of receivables of similar types, the easier the determination of expected losses and the methods of covering those losses, including
covering losses on defaulted receivables from the interest paid on performing receivables. For this reason, there is a large and functioning market for

31. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Securitization and Dodd-Frank, supra note 7, at 591-92; see also
STANDARD & POOR’S CORP., STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA 25-26 (1988) (providing a general
description of Standard & Poor’s methodology in assessing the credit quality of a pool of receivables
owed by unrated entities and remarking that its “‘asset loss’ model . . . is based on the belief that only
pools of assets that can withstand potential adverse circumstances merit high quality credit ratings”).
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automobile loan securities backed by prime receivables and also by subprime receivables that meet certain minimum criteria. 32
The analysis does not depend solely on the credit rating of the obligor.
Other characteristics of the receivables will affect cumulative net losses.
For example, cumulative net losses for obligors with identical credit ratings
were lower for auto loans secured by new cars compared to those secured
by used cars, and for auto loans with a term of sixty months compared to
those with a term of seventy-two months. 33 In addition, other factors may
affect a determination of the quality of a pool of automobile loans, such as
origination and underwriting standards and credit/risk scoring tools; servicing and collection policies; accounting policies; and dealer relationships
and monitoring tools. 34 Every lender must analyze all of these factors for
each type of receivable in structuring a securitization or structured finance
debt transaction secured by those receivables.
B. Legal Restrictions
As noted above, to achieve bankruptcy remoteness for the receivables,
there must be (1) a true sale to (2) a bankruptcy remote SPE. To achieve
these goals, the originator/seller, the SPE, and the lender must agree to
limitations that do not arise in direct secured lending transactions.
1. True Sale
Intent. First, to achieve a true sale, the documents effecting the sale
and the actions of the parties must express the intent that there be an absolute assignment of the receivables to the SPE borrower. 35 This requirement
does not constrain the parties, but it does require careful attention. Originators look to securitization as a form of financing and as business people,
may not be particularly interested in the legal terminology. They need to be
educated about the fact that the first transfer is a sale.
Fair Market Value Purchase Price. The second requirement for a true
sale is the receipt of fair market value by the seller for the receivables.36
32. See, e.g., S&P AUTO LOAN CRITERIA, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6, 15.
33. Id. at ¶ 29, tbl.2.
34. Id.
35. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Key to Securitization: Isolating the Assets to Be Securitized from the Risk of An Insolvency Proceeding, in OFFERINGS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
§ 8.03[B][1] (John Arnholz & Edward E. Gainor eds., 2d ed., 2013) (providing a detailed analysis of the
elements of a true sale) [hereinafter Plank, Isolating Assets].
36. See generally Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of
Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181,
207, 209-11 (1991); Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2]; Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1663.
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This requirement is not difficult to achieve. For example, assume a transfer
of a $100 receivable to a newly formed subsidiary SPE that will borrow
$75 from a lender. The seller will sell the receivable and receive $75 cash
and the equity interest in the SPE, which is worth approximately $25.37
The consideration for subsequent sales may consist of cash from subsequent borrowings and the principal collected on the receivables already
owned by the SPE, borrowings by the SPE from the seller under a subordinated note, or the increase in the value of the SPE. For example, if the SPE
owns receivables with a value of $1,000 previously transferred to it by the
seller and has borrowed $750 from a lender, the seller has an equity interest
in the SPE worth $250. The SPE could purchase another $100 in receivables, borrowing $75 from the lender and paying the other $25 in the form
of collections from the existing receivables, borrowing $25 from the seller
under a subordinated note, or simply recording an increase in the seller’s
equity interest of $25.
Transfer of Benefits and Burdens of Ownership. The legal requirement
that most constrains the seller, the SPE, and the lender is the rule that substantially all of the burdens and benefits of ownership of the receivables
must be transferred from the seller to the SPE. 38 The SPE buyer and the
lender to the SPE must bear most of the risk of loss from credit default. A
small amount of credit recourse to the seller for default by obligors is permitted, limited either to ten percent of the receivables sold or the expected
loss on the receivables. 39 This limited recourse is not a major source of
repayment, and in fact, it is intended primarily to create an incentive for the
seller to sell good quality receivables to the SPE.
Also, if the market value of the receivables changes because of changes in market interest rates, the SPE borrower and the lender must bear that
risk. 40 Generally, the seller may not guarantee that the borrower or the
37. Steven O. Weise has pointed out to me that, because the holder of the equity interest in the
SPE will be subordinate to other creditors of the SPE, the value of the equity would be slightly less than
$25 if the value of the receivable held by the SPE remains $100. Of course, the SPE is not designed to
have significant creditors but it may have a small amount of debt arising out of liability to service
providers, such as lawyers and accountants. On the other hand, in my experience, the value of the equity
in the SPE—because of the lower costs of securitization—will often be more than the difference between the market value of the receivable held by the originator for sale as a whole loan and the amount
of the SPE’s debt. In other words, the value of the equity could be worth $26 or $27 dollars.
38. See generally Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2]; Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1675; Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14
GEO MASON L. REV. 287, 333-34 (1991).
39. Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2]. Another exception is full recourse to the
seller for early payment default, that is, when the obligor fails to make a payment during the first month
or three months after the sale. See id. § 8.03[B][3].
40. For example, a five-year $10,000 automobile loan payable monthly and bearing interest at 6%
annually would have a present value of $9,534.63, a 4.65% decline, if rates on comparable loans sud-
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lender will receive a particular yield on the receivables or otherwise protect
the SPE or the lender from a decrease in the market value of the receivables. 41 On the other hand, the seller is generally prohibited from being able
to repurchase the receivables at par to capture any increase in the market
value of the receivables.42
One other characteristic of receivables is that they must be serviced.43
The advantage of receivables is that they turn into cash almost by themselves. I say “almost” become someone has to collect and process the payments on the receivables, account for the payments, and, when obligors
become delinquent, attempt to collect from the obligors. This burden, similar to the burden of maintaining a car to keep it running, should be shifted
to the buyer of the receivables. The seller is often retained as the agent for
the buyer to service the loans because the seller has the familiarity with the
obligors, and servicing is a good business that generates an income stream.
Retention of the servicing is not inconsistent with a true sale so long as the
buyer can replace the servicer for poor performance, the servicer has no
liability for the performance of the receivables other than liability for its
failure to service the loans properly, and the servicer earns a reasonable fee
that adequately compensates it for its services.
2. Bankruptcy Remote SPE
The purpose of a bankruptcy remote SPE is to protect the lender from
three different types of risks of bankruptcy: (1) the risk that the SPE will
engage in activities other than owning the receivables and borrowing money from the lender, and therefore become a debtor in bankruptcy as a result
of those activities, that is, for reasons not related to the receivables them-

denly increase to 8%, and a present value of $10,497.53, a 4.98% increase, if such rates suddenly fall to
10%. The longer the term of the receivable, such as a fixed rate 30-year mortgage loan, the greater the
change in market value, even taking into account prepayments. For example, a 2% swing in interest
rates on a 30-year mortgage loan could, depending on the assumed rate of prepayments, generate a
decline in the present value of more than 10% or an increase of up to 6%. See Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779, 790, tbl.4 (2009) (describing the range of the decline or
increase in present value depending on the prepayment rates).
41. One exception is the requirement that if a seller has sold a receivable at a premium, say, 102%
of the principal balance, and it pays off within a short period of time after the sale, say between three
and six months (depending on the receivable), the seller may be required to refund to the buyer the
premium that it received, that is, the 2%. See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE
FAMILY 992 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel040913.pdf
(discussing premium pricing recapture for mortgage loans that pay off within 120 days of the date of
sale to Fannie Mae).
42. See generally Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2][c] (also discussing permissible types of repurchase options).
43. Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.03[B][2].
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selves (“Non-Asset Risk”); (2) the risk that a parent of the SPE will cause
the SPE to file for bankruptcy to obtain some benefit for the parent (“Parent
Opportunism Risk”); and (3) the risk that, if the parent of the SPE were to
become a debtor in bankruptcy, a bankruptcy court will consolidate the
assets and liabilities of the SPE with those of the parent under the doctrine
of substantive consolidation (“Substantive Consolidation Risk”). 44 To protect from these risks, the charter documents establishing the SPE and the
other transaction documents will contain provisions that constrain the seller
or parent of the SPE, the SPE itself, and the lender. These constraints create
costs. 45
To address the Non Asset Risk, the SPE charter will limit its activities
to owning the receivables and borrowing from the lender. 46 The major
constraint here is that these limitations may prevent a legitimate expansion
of the SPE’s activities. For example, if the SPE can only own automobile
loans, then it may not be able to securitize automobile leases. This is a relatively minor risk or cost.
To address the Parent Opportunism Risk, the SPE charter will require
the SPE to engage a director, in the case of a corporation, or an independent manager, in the case of a limited liability company, or some other person that is independent of the parent. 47 The SPE charter will require the
consent of the independent person to authorize the filing of a bankruptcy
petition and certain other major actions, such as dissolution. Directors and
managers appointed by the parent of the SPE who are officers, directors, or
employees of the parent would be expected to follow the directions of the
parent even if those directions were not necessarily in the best interest of
the SPE, such as filing a bankruptcy petition when the SPE is solvent and
paying its debts as they come due. An independent director or manager,
however, is expected to consider the interests of the SPE, and to the extent
legally possible, its creditors. Hence, if the SPE does not need to be a debtor in bankruptcy because it is not in default or otherwise insolvent in a cash
flow or balance sheet sense, it is expected that the independent director or
manager would not vote to authorize a bankruptcy filing simply because
the filing may benefit the parent. This limitation does constrain the seller or
parent of the SPE, and it also entails some cost.

44. See generally Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1664-66.
45. See Plank, Isolating Assets, supra note 35, § 8.04 (providing a detailed discussion of the
requirements to satisfy these risks).
46. Id. § 8.04[A][2].
47. Id. § 8.04[A][1].
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Finally, to address Substantive Consolidation Risk, the SPE charter
will contain a set of separateness covenants that require the SPE to operate
separately from the parent, to observe all legal formalities, and to segregate
its assets, books, records, and bank accounts from those of the parent.48
Accordingly, even though the activities of the SPE are limited to owning
and pledging assets, the SPE must incur the costs of a real separate legal
entity. Further, the lender must primarily rely on the credit of the SPE and
its assets. 49 It cannot obtain a general guarantee from the parent, as is
common in many ordinary corporate financings. At most, it may obtain
only a very limited guarantee, generally not to exceed ten percent of the
SPE’s debt or the amount of recourse allowed for a seller of the receivables
if the seller is the parent.
IV. SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE FOR ABERRANT
CONTRACT RECEIVABLES
The material in this Symposium presents a disturbing picture of some
aberrant contracts, especially the ones that bear very high interest rates. On
the other hand, people should have the freedom to enter into contracts of
their choosing or, as is often the case, to accept or reject the contract terms
that are available. Laws and regulations that help the market function better
are desirable, but very often laws and regulations are a form of rent seeking
that protects special interests, whether those special interests are business
interests or bureaucratic and political interests. This article does not address
the utility of these aberrant contracts. This article does suggest some issues
and constraints on whether the rights to payments under these aberrant
contracts—aberrant contract receivables—can be securitized. The utility of
the securitization of aberrant contract receivables is different from the utility of the aberrant contracts themselves and the former should, in my view,
be left to the decisions of the parties, which are commercial actors.
One of the key requirements for financing receivables through a securitization or structured finance transaction is the reliability and predictability of the cash flow from the receivables. 50 Some of the contracts
considered to be aberrant contracts in this Symposium may produce cash
flows of sufficient reliability and predictability for a securitization or structured finance transaction and others may not.

48. Id. § 8.04[B][1].
49. Id. § 8.04[B][2].
50. See supra Part III.A.
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In assessing the feasibility of financing aberrant contract receivables
through a securitization or structured finance transaction, it is important to
consider that, even for traditional receivables securitization and structured
finance transactions are not the primary source for financing. For example,
according to statistics published by the Federal Reserve Board, from the
end of 1995 to the end of 2009, consumer credit grew from $1.2 trillion to
$2.4 trillion.51 Of this amount, the balance held by United States depository
institutions, other than credit unions, grew from about $542 million to $906
million, with the percentage dropping from forty-six percent of the total at
the end of 1995 to thirty-four percent at the end of 2002; it then increased
slightly to thirty-eight percent and thirty-seven percent, respectively, at the
end of 2008 and 2009. 52
The balance held by issuers of asset backed securities (“ABS Issuers”)
grew from $213 million at the end of 1995 to $625 million at the end of
2007 and then declined to $575 million at the end of 2009; the percentage
increased from eighteen percent of the total at the end of 1995 to a high of
thirty-two percent at the end of 2002, and then declined to twenty-three
percent at the end of 2009. 53 During this time, the consumer receivables
held by finance companies grew from $152 million at the end of 1995 to
$572 million at the end of 2007, and then declined to $471 million at the
end of 2009; the percentages ranged between twelve percent and twentytwo percent during this period. 54 These figures somewhat understate the
amount of consumer finance receivables held by ABS Issuers because the
Federal Reserve Board statistics for ABS Issuers only include those assets
that are not consolidated on the books of their originators. 55 Some finance

51. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS;
HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 2005-2012 98, tbl.222, l.2 (2013) [hereinafter FRB FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTS 2005-2012]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC
ACCOUNTS; HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 1995-2004 98, tbl.222, l.2 (June 3, 2013) [hereinafter FRB
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 1995-2004].
52. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.6; FRB FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.6. The percentage held by credit unions ranged
between ten and eleven percent during this time. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra
note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.7; FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.7.
53. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.9; FRB FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.8.
54. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.10; FRB
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 1995-2004, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.9.
55. See FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, G19 CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY SERIES, at
n.8 (May 2013).
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companies did not treat the sale of receivables to their wholly owned SPEs
as a “sale” for accounting purposes. 56
Banks and finance companies use securitization and structured finance
transactions as just one source and not the primary source of financing for
traditional receivables. The choice to use securitization and structured finance transactions for these receivables depends on the relative costs and
benefits of securitization and structured finance transactions versus the
costs and benefits of other sources. If securitization or structured finance
transactions for a particular type of receivables entail greater costs, those
costs may overwhelm the savings achieved by avoiding the bankruptcy tax
on direct secured lending to originators.
The nature of aberrant contract receivables and the restrictions demanded by the bankruptcy remote structure could prevent any meaningful
use of securitization or structured finance for most types of aberrant contracts. Securitization and structured finance transactions work for traditional receivables because lenders can assess the credit quality of the receivareceivables largely independent of the activities of an operating company.
An automobile loan turns into cash almost by itself. An item of inventory,
such as a car on a dealer’s lot or an item of equipment like a truck owned
by a trucking company, does not turn into cash by itself. It produces cash
only because of the activities of an operating company, that is, a dealer that
sells cars or a trucking company that uses trucks to transport goods.
To be sure, receivables must be serviced, and the value of a pool of
receivables does depend to a certain extent on the quality of the servicing.
56. Under the accounting standards in effect during the period from 1995 through 2009, including
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES (2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas140.pdf, an originator that sold receivables to a wholly-owned subsidiary could obtain a sale for
accounting purposes, that is, recognized a gain or loss on the transfer. In June 2009, the FASB issued
two statements, effective for reporting periods that ended after November 30, 2009, which essentially
required consolidation of the receivables owned by an SPE and the debt of the SPE with the assets and
liabilities of an originator or affiliate that owned the SPE. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF
THE FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166:
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AN AMENDMENT OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 140
(2009); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF THE FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 167: AMENDMENTS TO FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R)
(2009).
I did not set forth any of the balances for 2010 or later. Because of this change in the accounting
rules, most of the consumer receivables held by ABS Issuers are held on the books of their originating
banks or finance companies, and the Federal Reserve Board does not include those in the assets of ABS
Issuers. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., G19 CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY
SERIES, at n.9 (May 2013). Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Board statistics for the years after 2010
provide little meaningful information. For example, the balance of consumer receivables held by ABS
Issuers declined from $573 million, or 23.69%, as of the end of 2009, to $50 million, or 1.99%, as of
the end of 2010. See FRB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 2005-2012, supra note 51, at 98, tbl.222, l.8.
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This portion of the value of the receivables, however, is small in comparison to the value of the pool. If a servicer is servicing a pool poorly, the
servicer can be replaced. Most securitization and structured finance transactions, in my experience, absent poor performance of the receivables, have
sufficient credit cushion to survive a poor servicer that must be replaced.
If the value of the pool of receivables, however, depends too much on
the ongoing actions of the originator or servicer, a securitization or structured finance transaction may not be feasible. A few simple examples will
illustrate the point.57
First, assume that an originator originates and holds a pool of good
quality receivables that amortize monthly over a five-year period and bear
interest at 6%. The interest rate is intended to cover expected defaults and
the cost of servicing. Assume an annual default rate of 0.25% with no recoveries and a servicing fee of 1%. The remainder of the interest earned—
net interest of 4.75% in this example—is intended to cover the originator’s
cost of funds, its operational costs of originating receivables, and profit.
The assumed default rate would generate cumulative net losses of 0.67% of
the original principal balance of the pool, and the total servicing fee paid
would also equal 2.67% of the original principal balance of the pool and
2.31% of the total principal and net interest collected, that is, interest net of
defaults. 58
The servicing burden inherent in the receivables is very small relative
to the principal to be paid and the interest to be earned. If the originator
transfers the receivables to a wholly owned SPE that borrows from a lender, the lender can easily assess the credit quality of the receivables and the
predictability and reliability of the cash flow from the receivables. In this
case, the lender is relying almost exclusively—greater than 97%—on the
willingness and the ability of the obligor on the receivables to pay, and the
costs of and losses arising from replacing the originator, as a servicer, will
also be relatively small. The SPE borrower will obtain the net benefit of a
lower interest rate, against slightly higher costs, from the bankruptcy remote structure, and as the owner of the SPE borrower, the originator will
also receive that benefit.
Second, assume a pool of receivables of lower quality that amortize
monthly over a five-year period and bear interest at an annual rate of 24%.
Also assume an annual default rate of 3% with no recoveries and a servic57. I developed the following two examples by constructing cash flows in an Excel document.
The cash flows are available from the author and the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
58. Some of these numbers would be slightly smaller on a present value basis, that is, discounting
the future values to the value as of the date of the origination of the pool.
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ing fee of 3%. The net interest would be 18%, which is necessary to cover
the higher cost of funds and higher operational costs for an originator of
these types of receivables.59 This default rate would generate cumulative
net losses of 9.08% of the original pool balance, and the total servicing fee
paid would also equal 9.08% of the original principal balance of the pool
and 5.55% of the total principal and net interest collected, that is, interest
less defaults. Although higher, the servicing burden inherent in the receivables is still less than 10% of the original principal balance of the pool to be
paid and about 5.9% of total principal paid and net interest to be earned. In
this case, the lender is still relying primarily—greater than 90%—on the
willingness and the ability of the obligor on the receivables to pay.
Now assume a contract of $1,000 on which the originator induces the
obligor to pay 300% interest over a one-year period and then at the end of
the year the originator writes off the principal amount as a complete loss.
This looks like an aberrant contract. Out of 300% interest collected
($3,000), 100% ($1,000) covers the total loss of principal. Assume that the
originator obtains funds from equity investors and must pay a 25% annual
return out of the remaining 200% ($2,000). That still leaves 175% ($1,750)
for the costs of servicing this particular loan and the other operating costs.
The much higher costs for servicing and other operations, if they are legitimate, indicates that a lender willing to finance this type of receivable
would necessarily need to rely more on the ability of the originator to service the loan—including inducing the obligor to make the high interest
payments—than on the willingness and ability of the obligor to pay.
Reliance on an operating company does not make a bankruptcy remote structure irrelevant. A bankruptcy remote structure for operating
companies will reduce some risks because of the separation of one set of
operational risks from another set of operational risks. For example, single
asset real estate financings often use a bankruptcy remote, special purpose
financing structure. 60 The entity that owns the real estate and borrows under a real estate loan will be an SPE, whose charter contains separateness
covenants and may require an independent director or manager. Law firms
often provide an opinion that the SPE borrower would not be substantively
consolidated with its direct and indirect parents, which may own many

59. On the basis of my experience, a plausible breakdown of the costs would be about seven
percent for interest costs, eight percent for operating expenses other than servicing, and about three
percent for profit. These higher operating costs reflect a smaller pool balance as well as the nature of the
receivables.
60. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, U.S. CMBS LEGAL AND STRUCTURED
FINANCE CRITERIA (2003).
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other entities that own real estate projects. 61 Lenders to a single asset real
estate SPE need only assess the operating risks of that SPE and not the
operating risks of other real estate projects owned by affiliates of the SPE.
Nevertheless, the lender is lending against an entity that owns and operates
a business and not against a large pool of receivables that will turn into
cash with little effort by an operating company.
There are two examples of transactions that illustrate the limits of a
bankruptcy remote structure: (1) attempts to securitize servicing fees and
(2) so-called hybrid transactions. Servicing of receivables under a servicing
agreement generates servicing fees. The right to receive the servicing fees
is itself a receivable, an “account” under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which can
be assigned. 62 Accordingly, the right to receive servicing fees can be sold
to an SPE that could borrow money from a lender. 63 Servicing fee receivables fit neatly into the legal structure for a securitization or a structured
finance transaction.
Nevertheless, the nature of servicing fee receivables precludes widespread use of servicing fee receivables in structured finance and securitization transactions. Servicing fees are earned by the performance of the
servicer. If the servicer fails to perform under the servicing agreement, and
either the servicing agreement is terminated or the servicer is terminated as
servicer, the fees could end. Further, if the servicer that sells the servicing
fees to the SPE becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee
may reject the servicer’s obligation to service, which would terminate the
right to receive the servicing fees. 64 The bankruptcy trustee would reject
the servicing agreement if the costs of servicing exceeded the servicing fee
earned. Accordingly, a lender that would lend funds against servicing fee
receivables as collateral necessarily must rely extensively on the continued
performance of an operating company.
There are ways to mitigate the risks inherent in servicing fee receivables. To the extent that the servicing fees exceed the cost of servicing, the
servicer could sell the right to receive excess servicing to an SPE. For example, if the servicer is earning a servicing fee of 35 basis points, but the
cost of servicing is 20 basis points, the servicer could sell the right to re-

61. Id. at 95, 105-09.
62. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2010) (defining an “account” as “a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance . . . (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered”).
63. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (providing that Article 9 of the U.C.C. applies to “(1) a transaction,
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract; [and]
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes”).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (A bankruptcy trustee “may assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”).
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ceive 10 basis points to an SPE that could obtain a loan secured by the
excess servicing fee. In this case, the reliability of the cash flow from the
excess servicing is enhanced because the lender to the SPE can rely on the
servicer’s continued incentive to service the underlying loans well. Accordingly, in my experience, although it is has been difficult to structure an
absolute assignment of all the servicing fee receivables, assignments of
excess servicing are common.
Another example of a transaction that illustrates the limits of a bankruptcy remote structure is what Standard & Poor’s Rating Services calls a
“hybrid” transaction that combines elements of both securitization and
corporate finance.65 In a hybrid transaction, an SPE holds assets other than
traditional receivables that are serviced or managed by a parent servicer in
a way that generates funds to repay debt borrowed by the SPE. 66 As Standard & Poor’s notes, however:
[T]he legal techniques used in a securitization generally cannot alone
achieve complete isolation of the credit risk of the operating assets. The
legal structure may not remove some uncertain cash flow characteristics
of the securitized assets. Thus, Standard & Poor’s criteria for hybrid
transactions recognize that, while the integrity of a particular transaction’s legal structure should be established and maintained, the structure
itself is unlikely to insulate completely the transaction from the more active types of operational or servicing risk. 67

The 2000 LTV Steel Company bankruptcy case provides a useful contrast between a typical securitization of receivables and a hybrid transaction. Although LTV Steel had emerged from bankruptcy in 1993, it was
able to sponsor a trade receivables securitization in 1994. In this transaction, LTV Steel entered into a revolving sale agreement to sell accounts,
representing the obligation of buyers of steel products to pay for those
products within a specified time period, to an SPE. The SPE entered into a
revolving credit agreement providing for the issuance of debt secured by
the receivables. The debt obtained a rating of “AAA” from Standard &
Poor’s Rating Services, the highest rating available. 68
Four years later, LTV Steel also sponsored an “inventory securitization.” In this transaction, LTV Steel entered into a revolving sale agreement
to sell unfinished steel products, its inventory, to a separate SPE. This inventory SPE entered into a revolving credit agreement providing for the
65. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S.
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 145 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). For an extended discussion
of the LTV Steel transaction, see Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1686-98.
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issuance of debt secured by the inventory. LTV Steel was hired as the servicer to process the inventory and sell finished steel products on behalf of
the inventory SPE.
The debt issued by the inventory SPE obtained a rating of only “BBB”
from Fitch Rating Services, which is the lowest rating that is considered an
“investment grade” rating. Although the BBB rating for the inventory securitization was presumably higher than LTV’s corporate rating, which must
therefore have been below investment grade, it was substantially lower than
the AAA rating of the trade receivables securitization. 69 Hence, a securitization structure provided some benefit for the inventory securitization.
Nevertheless, because the lenders in the inventory securitization were still
relying to a substantial degree on LTV’s manufacturing and selling operations, the benefit to the structure was significantly less than the benefits of
the trade receivables securitization. This much lower benefit shows the
limitations of a securitization or structured finance transaction for assets
other than receivables that generate cash flow substantially by themselves. 70
Structured finance and securitization transactions involving traditional
receivables offer substantial financing savings because of (a) the nature of
the receivables and (b) the bankruptcy remote requirements. In these transactions, a pool of traditional receivables will produce reasonably predictable and reliable cash flows from many obligors, most of who are able and
willing to pay the amounts they owe. Often the credit quality of the pool is
greater than the credit quality of the originator. The risk of default is spread
among many obligors and, given a sufficiently large number of obligors,
can be predicted. The bankruptcy remote requirements separate the risks
associated with the receivables from all of the other risks associated with
the originator of the receivables. A lender to an SPE holding these receivables relies almost entirely on the pool of receivables and not on any one
particular operating company.

69. Around the time of this case, the four highest rating categories (AAA, AA, A, and BBB for
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, and Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa for Moody’s, for example) were generally
considered “investment grade” securities. See Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at 1661,
n.16. The classification system has not changed. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO CREDIT
RATING ESSENTIALS 10-11 (2011) (describing “investment grade” ratings as AAA, AA, A, BBB [including BBB-] and “speculative grade” ratings as BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D).
70. In addition, when steel prices fell in 1999 and 2000, LTV filed for bankruptcy in December
2000 and unsuccessfully attacked both the inventory securitization and the trade receivables securitization to fund its reorganization. The very existence of the inventory securitization and the degree of
reliance on the operational capacity of the servicer formed the basis for the ultimately unsuccessful
attack on the trade receivables securitization. See Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 11, at
1686-98.
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If, however, an SPE holds assets, whether receivables or other types,
that produce cash flow primarily because of the activities of a single person
or a few persons, such as an originator and a servicer, the bankruptcy remote structure provides less practical benefit. Accordingly, if the cash flow
from aberrant contract receivables depends too much on the ability of the
originator to generate such cash flow and not enough on the ability and
willingness of a sufficiently large pool of obligors to pay, financing such
aberrant contract receivables through a securitization or structured finance
transaction may not be possible or at least not cost effective.
Moreover, if a lender that makes a loan to an SPE secured by a pool of
receivables owned by the SPE cannot rely primarily on the ability and willingness of the obligors on the receivables to pay, that lender would seek
assurance of repayment from the originator or servicer in the form of credit
recourse on the receivables or other guarantees of payment of the SPE’s
debt. However, to the extent that the originator or servicer provided such
assurance beyond the limited assurance permitted for a bankruptcy remote
structure, the transaction would cease to be bankruptcy remote. The benefits that a structured finance or securitization transaction offers by avoiding
most of the bankruptcy tax on secured credit extended to the originator
would be lost.
On the other hand, receivables that may be considered aberrant contract receivables but that produce reasonably predictable and reliable cash
flows from obligors willing and able to make the required payments without too much reliance on the operations of the originator of those receivables may be financeable through a cost-effective structured finance or
securitization transaction.
V. CONCLUSION
The feasibility of financing any particular pool of aberrant contract receivables through a structured finance or securitization transaction depends
on an extensive analysis of each type of contract, each type of obligor, the
nature of the cash flows, and the extent to which those cash flows depend
on a single operating entity. The other articles in this Symposium will provide insight to such feasibility.

